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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge: 
 
Allen Powell appeals his sentence of 192 months of 
imprisonment followed by five years supervised release. He 
argues that the district court erred by not ruling on his pro 
se motion for a downward departure based upon conditions 
of confinement, and by imposing a period of supervised 
release that was longer than explained in his plea 
agreement and the change of plea colloquy. 
 
For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the sentence 
and remand to the district court for clarification of its 
rationale for denying his motion for a downward departure. 
Our remand will also allow the district court to consider a 
concession regarding the supervised release that the 
government has made during the course of this appeal. 
 
I. Background 
 
On November 9, 1999, a grand jury charged Powell with 
one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1). On December 15, 1999, 
the government filed a notice of prior convictions statement 
 
                                2 
  
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 1924(e).1  Thereafter, Powell entered 
into a written plea agreement. In that agreement, the 
government stipulated that his "offense level is 33, 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.4, because he is an 
armed career criminal," and that Powell was eligible for a 
three-point downward departure for acceptance of 
responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. SS 3E1.1(a) & (b). App. 
at 129a-30a. The government also agreed to "[m]ake 
whatever sentencing recommendation as to imprisonment, 
fines, forfeiture, restitution and other matters which the 
government deems appropriate." Id. at 127a. The plea 
agreement also stated: 
 
       [Powell] has the three prior convictions set forth in the 
       Notice of Defendant's Prior Convictions for Enhanced 
       Sentencing Under Title 18, United States Code, Section 
       924(e) filed by the government in this action. Therefore, 
       the defendant understands, agrees and has had 
       explained to him by counsel that the Court may impose 
       the following maximum sentence; Life imprisonment-- 
       with a 15-year mandatory minimum term of 
       imprisonment -- a $250,000 fine, a three-year term of 
       supervised release and a $100 special assessment. . . 
 
       The defendant may not withdraw his plea because the 
       Court declines to follow any recommendation, motion 
       or stipulation by the parties to this agreement. No one 
       has promised or guaranteed to the defendant what 
       sentence the Court will impose. 
 
Id. at 127-28 (emphasis added). The agreement further 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 924 is entitled "Penalties," and states: 
 
       (e)(1) In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this 
title 
       and has three previous convictions by any court referred to in 
       section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious 
drug 
       offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one 
another, 
       such person shall be fined not more than $25,000 and imprisoned 
       not less than fifteen years. . . . 
 
18 U.S.C. S 924(e). Section 924(e), which does not expressly delineate a 
maximum term of imprisonment, has been construed to allow a life 
sentence. United States v. Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 229 n.4 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(citing Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994)). 
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provided that the stipulations did not bind the court and 
that the court could make determinations that might 
increase or decrease the applicable range under the 
Sentencing Guidelines, and thereby affect Powell's 
sentence. 
 
At the ensuing change of plea hearing, the court asked 
the government to state the maximum penalty. The 
prosecutor responded as follows: 
 
       The maximum penalties are life imprisonment, a 
       $250,000.00 fine, a three-year term of supervised 
       release and a $100.00 special assessment. There is a 
       fifteen-year mandatory minimum prison sentence, 
       which is applicable to this case. 
 
       THE COURT: Mr. Powell, do you understand the 
       maximum penalty to be just as stated by the Assistant 
       United States Attorney? 
 
       THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
       THE COURT: Has your attorney discussed with you the 
       sentencing guidelines? 
 
       THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
       THE COURT: Do you understand, the Court will not be 
       able to determine how the sentencing guidelines will be 
       applied in your case, until after the presentence 
       investigation report is completed and you and the 
       Government have had an opportunity to challenge the 
       facts reported by the Probation Officer? 
 
       DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
       *** 
       *** 
 
       THE COURT: Do you understand that the Court could 
       in appropriate circumstances, impose a sentence which 
       is more severe than the sentence, which the guidelines 
       recommend? 
 
       DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
       THE COURT: Do you understand that if you are sent to 
       prison, a term of supervised release may be imposed 
       when you are released from prison? 
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       DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
Id. 40a - 42a (emphasis added). The court accepted the 
guilty plea and ordered a Pre-sentence Investigation. 
 
Thereafter, while in custody awaiting sentencing, Powell 
sent a letter to the district court complaining of what he 
characterized as substandard conditions at the Hudson 
County Jail in New Jersey where he was being detained 
pending sentencing. He attached a list of those conditions, 
and argued that the conditions entitled him to a downward 
departure pursuant to United States v. Brinton , 139 F.3d 
718 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 
The Presentence Report that the court subsequently 
received stated that the maximum sentence was "life 
imprisonment, with a mandatory minimum of 15 years, 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 924(e)." PSI atP 50. The sentencing 
range in the report was calculated between 180 to 210 
months of imprisonment.2 The PSI also stated "[i]f a term of 
imprisonment is imposed, the Court may impose a term of 
supervised release of not more than five years , pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. S 3583(b)(1)." PSI at P 53 (emphasis added). 
 
Defense counsel objected to the recommendations in the 
PSI based upon the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi 
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000). He 
argued that Powell should not be subjected to sentencing 
enhancements under 18 U.S.C. S 924(e) and U.S.S.G. 
S 4B1.4(b)(3)(B) because the indictment failed to allege the 
predicate convictions for those enhancements. Even though 
Powell had previously been informed that the maximum 
supervised release that could be imposed was three years, 
he neither questioned nor objected to the report's statement 
that the maximum term was five years. 
 
The district court concluded that the applicable 
sentencing range under the guidelines was 180 to 210 
months followed by a period of supervised release of three 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The PSI stated "based on a total offense level of 30 and a criminal 
history category of VI, the guideline range for imprisonment is 168 to 
210 months. However, since the mandatory minimum term of 
imprisonment is 180 months, the effective guideline range is 180 to 
210 months." PSI at P 51 (emphasis in original). 
 
                                5 
  
to five years. Powell did not object. The court interpreted 
Powell's letter about the conditions at the Hudson County 
facility as a pro se motion for a downward departure based 
on the substandard conditions of his presentence 
detention. App. at 48a. 
 
The court rejected Powell's Apprendi claim, and 
sentenced Powell to 192 months of imprisonment (16 years) 
plus a five-year term of supervised release. The court 
imposed that sentence without ever formally ruling upon 
Powell's motion for a downward departure based upon the 
conditions of his presentence detention. This appeal 
followed. 
 
II. Jurisdiction, Issues & Standards of Review  
 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
S 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
S 3742, and 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We must decide if the district 
court erred in failing to address Powell's request for a 
downward departure based on substandard conditions of 
confinement. "We review the district court's decisions 
concerning departures from the Sentencing Guidelines for 
abuse of discretion." United States v. Abuhouran, 161 F.3d 
206, 209 (3d Cir. 1998). However, when reviewing legal 
questions regarding the application of the guidelines, "we 
need not defer to the district court's conclusion, and we will 
review its holding for legal error." Id. Here, however, we do 
not know why the district court rejected Powell's request for 
a downward departure. The court merely announced that it 
would treat Powell's letter as a pro se motion for a 
departure, but sentenced Powell without departing from the 
applicable guideline range, and without explicitly ruling on 
Powell's pro se motion. For the purposes of this appeal, we 
will assume that the court's sentence to the suggested 
guideline range constituted an implicit denial of Powell's 
motion for a downward departure. In United States v. 
Mummert we explained our jurisdiction to review a district 
court's denial of a motion for departure. We stated: 
 
       [I]f the ruling was based on the district court's belief 
       that a departure was legally impermissible, we have 
       jurisdiction to determine whether the district court's 
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       understanding of the law was correct. By contrast, if 
       the district court's ruling was based on an exercise of 
       discretion, we lack jurisdiction [under United States v. 
       Denardi, 892 F.2d 269, 271-72 (1989)]. 
 
United States v. Mummert, 34 F.3d 201, 205 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
We must also determine if Powell's guilty plea agreement 
included an understanding as to the supervised release he 
was exposed to and if so, whether he is entitled to specific 
performance of that portion of his plea agreement. 3 We 
review that claim for harmless error. Fed.R.Crim.P.11(h);4 
United States v. Electrodyne Systems Corp., 147 F.3d 250, 
252 (3d Cir. 1998). Our review of whether the government 
violated the terms of the plea agreement is plenary as it is 
a question of law, and there is no factual dispute. United 
States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.3d 1357, 1360 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
A. Powell's Pro Se Downward Departure Motion 
 
Inasmuch as the district sentenced Powell without ruling 
on his request for a downward departure, we have no way 
of knowing why the district court denied the requested 
departure. As noted above, under United States v. Denardi, 
892 F.2d 269, 271-72 (3rd Cir. 1989), if the court chose to 
do so as an exercise of discretion, we have no jurisdiction 
to review its decision. The government concedes that under 
United States v. Mummert, this matter should be remanded 
to afford the district court an opportunity to explain its 
refusal to grant Powell's pro se motion. In Mummert, as 
here, the defendant appealed the district court's failure to 
grant a requested downward departure following a guilty 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In the alternative, Powell argues that he should be allowed to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
 
4. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(h) provides: 
 
       (h) Harmless Error. Any variance from the procedures required by 
       this rule which does not effect substantial rights shall be 
       disregarded. 
 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h). 
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plea. The district court had not given any explanation for 
denying Mummert's request. We remanded stating: 
 
       in cases such as this, where the record does not make 
       clear whether the district court's denial of departure 
       was based on legal or discretionary grounds, we believe 
       that the appropriate course of action is to vacate the 
       sentence and remand for the district court to clarify 
       the basis for its ruling. 
 
34 F.3d at 205. 
 
Accordingly, we will remand so that the district court can 
clarify its rejection of Powell's motion for a downward 
departure. 
 
B. Powell's Sentence 
 
Powell's supervised release presents a more difficult 
question. Powell contends that he is entitled to specific 
performance of the plea agreement or, in the alternative, 
withdrawal of his guilty plea. As noted above, Powell's 
written plea agreement expressly stated that the court 
could not impose more than three years of supervised 
release. Similarly, the Assistant United States Attorney 
informed Powell that he was not exposed to more than 
three years of supervised release at the Rule 11 change of 
plea hearing, and that statement was never corrected by 
the court. However, Powell's sentence included a five year 
term of supervised release as allowed under 18 U.S.C. 
S 924. Powell therefore argues that he did not voluntarily 
and intelligently change his plea, and that the government 
breached its "promise" that he would not be exposed to 
more than three years of supervised release. We will 
address each argument in turn.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Powell also argues that we should vacate his sentence based on our 
decision in United States v. Gilchrist, 130 F.2d 1141, 1133 (3d Cir. 
1997), where we vacated the defendant's sentence because the district 
court caused a breach of the defendant's guilty plea agreement. There, 
however, the parties entered into a guilty plea agreement pursuant to 
Rule 11(e)(1)(C), which is binding on the court once accepted. Because 
there is no indication in the record before us that the parties entered 
into the guilty plea agreement here pursuant to Rule 11(e)(1)(C), we find 
that this assertion is without merit, and need not be addressed. 
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1. Whether Powell Entered the Plea Voluntarily 
and Intelligently 
 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 was formulated to ensure that a 
defendant's guilty plea represents a voluntary and 
intelligent decision to waive fundamental protections. See 
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 30 (1970); McCarthy 
v. United States, 394 U.S.459, 465 (1969). Accordingly, 
under Fed. R. Crim.P. 11(c) "[b]efore accepting a plea of 
guilty . . . the court must address the defendant personally 
in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine 
that the defendant understands . . . the maximum possible 
penalty provided by law, including the effect of any. . . 
supervised release term." It is undisputed that Powell was 
misinformed about the length of supervised release that he 
could receive. 
 
Nevertheless, not all Rule 11 errors invalidate a guilty 
plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h), entitled "Harmless Error," 
provides that "[a]ny variance from the procedures required 
by [Rule 11] which does not affect substantial rights shall 
be disregarded." Accordingly, we must determine if the 
misinformation here affected Powell's substantial rights. 
 
Every circuit court of appeals that has considered a case 
involving a defendant who is misinformed as to the 
maximum term of supervised release, but who receives a 
sentence with a combined term of imprisonment and 
supervised release that is less than the maximum possible 
penalty has concluded that the misinformation constituted 
harmless error. See United States v. Raineri, 42 F.3d 36 
(1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Andrades, 179 F. 3d 131 
(2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Gracia, 983 F.2d 625 (5th 
Cir. 1993); United States v. Fuentes-Mendoza, 56 F.3d 1113 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Similarly, we need not address Powell's Apprendi  claim. Powell's 
sentence was enhanced based upon prior convictions that he conceded 
in his plea agreement. Accordingly, Apprendi does not apply. See 
Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63 ("other than the fact of a prior 
conviction, 
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.") (emphasis added). 
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(9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Barry, 895 F.2d 702 (10th 
Cir. 1990). 
 
Perhaps because of this seemingly uniform approach, the 
government urges us to adopt a blanket rule that"a failure 
to explain a supervised release term at a Rule 11 hearing is 
harmless error if the term of incarceration imposed, 
combined with the term of supervised release imposed, is 
less than the maximum sentence [the defendant was aware 
of]." Government's br. at 15. However, we do not think that 
a blanket rule is appropriate. 
 
In United States v. Cleary, 46 F.3d 307, 311 (3d Cir. 
1995), we held that a habeas petitioner under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2255, must show prejudice to obtain collateral relief for a 
Rule 11 violation. There, the sentencing court failed to 
explain the "effects of special parole, including the 
consequences of a violation, and that special parole is 
different from and in addition to regular parole." Id. at 310. 
We held: "[n]ot only must Cleary demonstrate an error of 
constitutional magnitude, but he also must show that he 
was prejudiced by that error, i.e., that he did not 
understand the consequences of his plea or that, if he had 
been properly advised about the effect of special parole, he 
would not have pled guilty." Id. We found that the failure 
there "did not rise to that level." Id.  
 
However, we have not previously addressed this precise 
question on direct appeal. The government rests its 
argument for a bright line rule in part upon United States 
v. Electrodyne Systems Corp., 147 F.3d 250 (3d Cir. 1998). 
There, the district court erred in advising the defendant of 
the correct statutory fine for the offense charged in one of 
the counts to which the defendant pled guilty. Id. at 252. 
The court did, however, correctly advise the defendant of 
the maximum fine that could be imposed on the remaining 
count. The total fine that the court ultimately imposed was 
less than the stated total maximum on both counts. On 
direct appeal, we held that the court's error as to the 
amount of the fine on one count was harmless. We 
concluded that, "when all is said and done, the immutable 
fact is . . . Defendant was fined . . . an amount below the 
exposure about which it was informed." Id.  at 253. 
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Nevertheless, though the analysis in Electrodyne  is 
certainly relevant to our inquiry here, the case is 
distinguishable from the instant case because the 
defendant there was misinformed about a fine. Supervised 
release "is a deprivation of some portion of one's liberty 
imposed as a punitive measure for a bad act." United States 
v. Dozier, 119 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 1997)."A defendant 
on supervised release is subject to various terms and 
conditions which restrict his freedom and which make him 
vulnerable to further punishment should he violate them. 
Such subsequent punishment may again include more 
imprisonment and more supervised release." Id. We cannot 
assume that misinformation about a possible deprivation of 
liberty is equivalent to misinformation about a monetary 
penalty. 
 
The government also relies on our decision in United 
States v. Mustafa, 238 F. 3d 485 (3d Cir. 2001), where we 
also addressed errors in a Rule 11 colloquy in the context 
of a direct appeal. One of the arguments that we rejected in 
Mustafa is relevant to the government's position here. 
Mustafa argued that the sentencing court erred in not 
inquiring into promises that had been made in relation to 
the change of plea. After reviewing the record we concluded 
that "the only reasonable conclusion that this record 
supports is that Mustafa had been advised of counsel's best 
estimate of what the court would actually impose, and 
Mustafa was interpreting counsel's estimate as a`promise' 
as to the sentence he was going to receive." Id. at 491-92. 
We noted: 
 
       Mustafa said absolutely nothing after his attorney 
       informed the court of guidelines discussions, and he 
       never said anything to suggest that his affirmative 
       response about other promises was anything more 
       than a reference to `assurances' he had received from 
       his attorney as to what sentence would most likely be 
       imposed. 
 
       Mustafa was told that the total maximum sentence was 
       830 years of imprisonment. The sentence of 
       imprisonment he received, though substantial (135 
       months), was far less than the maximum that he was 
       aware of. Moreover, any alleged misrepresentations 
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       that Mustafa's former counsel may have made 
       regarding sentencing calculations were dispelled when 
       Mustafa was informed in open court that there were no 
       guarantees as to sentence, and that the court could 
       sentence him to the maximum. Thus, we conclude that 
       Mustafa's answering `yes' to the court's inquiry about 
       promises is not grounds to invalidate his plea. 
 
Id. Immediately thereafter, we stated the following in a 
footnote: 
 
       We recognize that the maximum sentence authorized 
       by law is often so extraordinarily long that few 
       defendants other than `career criminals' plead guilty 
       with the expectation that the maximum sentence 
       applies to them. However, all that the law requires is 
       that the defendant be informed of his/her exposure in 
       pleading guilty. The law does not require that a 
       defendant be given a reasonably accurate `best guess' 
       as to what his/her actual sentence will be; nor could it, 
       given the vagaries and variables of each defendant's 
       circumstances and offending behavior. See United 
       States v. Cleary, 46 F.3d 307, 311 (3rd Cir. 1995). 
 
Id. n.5.6 
 
The government now argues that Mustafa creates a 
blanket rule that Rule 11 error is harmless so long as the 
defendant is not sentenced to a term longer than the 
maximum he or she is advised of. Put another way, the 
government is arguing that any such discrepancy could not 
have affected Powell's decision to plead guilty because the 
sentence imposed was within the range of possibilities a 
defendant accepts when deciding whether to plead guilty. 
We disagree. Such a bright line rule obfuscates its own 
underlying rational, and Mustafa is not to the contrary. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Mustafa also argued that the district court committed reversible error 
in not informing him that restitution could be ordered as part of the 
sentence in violation of Rule 11(c)(1). We noted that the government had 
advised Mustafa "that he faced a fine of several million dollars but was 
actually ordered to pay far less than that amount in restitution." Id. at 
490 (emphasis in original). While recognizing that restitution is not the 
same as a fine, we relied on Electrodyne and found the distinction 
irrelevant in context of that specific Rule 11 error. Id. at 490. 
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Mustafa is distinguishable from the case at bar because 
here the government affirmatively misled Powell during the 
plea colloquy and in the guilty plea agreement as to the 
maximum supervised term he could receive. In contrast, 
Mustafa involved the defendant interpreting his own 
counsel's best estimate as a "promise" as to the sentence he 
would receive. We acknowledged that few defendants 
actually expect that they will receive the statutory 
maximum they have been informed of,7 but explained that 
the law does not require that the defendant be given an 
accurate guess of what his or her ultimate sentence will be. 
 
Common sense suggests that a defendant's realistic 
expectation of the sentence he or she will receive will often 
include considerations of applicable ranges under the 
Sentencing Guidelines. However, the colloquy under Rule 
11 occurs when a defendant first enters a guilty plea. This, 
in turn, will almost always occur before the sentencing 
court has an opportunity to review a Presentence Report. 
Accordingly, the court will not be in a position to know 
what the realistic sentencing range will be when the court 
explains the maximum range of sentences to the defendant 
at the Rule 11 hearing. 
 
       While the Sentencing Guidelines certainly are a 
       relevant consideration for defendants entering a plea of 
       guilty, the district court at the time of the plea 
       allocution frequently has too little information available 
       to provide defendant with an accurate sentencing 
       range. For example, probation department officials 
       often have not scored or researched defendant's 
       criminal history, and the court is unaware of upward 
       or downward departure motions that the government 
       or defense counsel may pursue. Both of these factors 
       have significant impacts on Sentencing Guideline 
       calculations. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Several other circuit courts of appeals have also observed that a 
defendant might reasonably expect that he or she will not be sentenced 
to the statutory maximum. See United States v. Raineri, 42 F.3d at 42; 
United States v. Andrades, 169 F.3d at 134; United States v. Whyte, 3 
F.3d 129, 130 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 
                                13 
  
Andrades, 169 F.3d at 134. 
 
The court in Andrades, cited United States v. Raineri, in 
declaring: "we decline to adopt an inflexible rule" for 
resolving issues under Rule 11(h) Id. As we discuss below, 
Raineri provides for an individualized and flexible inquiry 
into determinations of harmless error under Rule 11(h). 
Nevertheless, despite its pronouncement that it was 
"declin[ing] to adopt an inflexible rule," the court in 
Andrades established what appears to be the kind of bright 
line inflexible rule urged upon us here. The court stated: 
 
       We now join with those circuit courts of appeals 
       holding that the error is harmless where the district 
       court misinforms a defendant of the applicable 
       supervised release term and the total sentence of 
       imprisonment and supervised release actually imposed 
       is less than that described during the plea allocution. 
 
169 F.3d at 134. 
 
We believe the court in Andrades was correct in stating 
its intent to reject a bright line rule based upon the 
reasoning in United States v. Raineri. First of all, we note 
that the Supreme Court has cautioned against taking 
errors committed during guilty plea proceedings lightly. See 
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969). A bright 
line rule, while easy to apply, minimizes the importance of 
the inquiry that must be undertaken when examining an 
individual decision to waive fundamental constitutional 
guarantees as is the case when a defendant enters a guilty 
plea. Accordingly, "[a]s the Advisory Notes to the 1983 
amendment to Rule 11 (adding subsection 11(h)) indicate, 
`it is still true, as the Supreme Court pointed out in 
McCarthy, that thoughtful and careful compliance with Rule 
11 best serves the fair and efficient administration of 
criminal justice. . . .' " United States v. Barry, 895 F.2d 702, 
705 (10th Cir. 1990). We believe the government's position 
here moves us away from thoughtful and careful 
compliance with Rule 11 and towards mechanical inquiries 
into violations of the Rule. 
 
Moreover, the difficulty in establishing a bright line rule 
is evidenced by the varying approaches that courts of 
appeals have taken in attempting to define harmless error 
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under Rule 11.8 The practical difficulty of such an approach 
is exemplified in the thoughtful analysis of the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit in Raineri. There, the court 
provides the following hypothetical: 
 
       imagine a defendant who is wrongly told at the Rule 11 
       hearing that the maximum penalty for his crime is five 
       years when in fact the maximum penalty is 15 years. 
       The defendant might fairly expect, given his own past 
       history and limited role in the offense, that the 
       maximum sentence (whatever it might be) would not be 
       likely to be imposed. If he then pled guilty and 
       thereafter received a five-year sentence, he might 
       reasonably think that the misinformation had 
       prejudiced him in a rather concrete way. 
 
42 F.3d at 41 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Whyte, 
3 F.3d 129, 130 (5th Cir. 1993)).9 The defendant in this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 1 F.3d 296, 302 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(en 
banc) (focusing on "whether the defendant's knowledge and 
comprehension of the full and correct information would have been likely 
to affect his willingness to plead guilty"); United States v. Goins, 51 
F.3d 
400, 402 (4th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Raineri, supra, 
(ascertaining whether the Rule 11 error led the defendant to reasonably 
expect a lesser sentence than he actually received); United States v. 
Andrades, supra, (refusing to adopt a rigid rule; United States v. 
Fuentes- 
Mendoza, 56 F.3d 1113, (9th Cir. 1995) (stating generally that error was 
harmless where the maximum term of restricted liberty that the 
defendant faced was less than the sentence he or she was informed of); 
United States v. Barry, supra, (determining whether the Rule 11 error 
had a "significant influence" on the defendant's decision to plead 
guilty); 
United States v. Syal, 963 F.2d 900, 906 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that 
"[s]ubstantial rights may not be affected when a defendant is informed of 
the maximum penalty and that penalty markedly exceeds the penalty the 
defendant received, including the period of supervised release and any 
additional incarceration time that might result from violation of [the] 
supervised release condition"). 
 
9. The error in United States v. Whyte, was far more egregious than the 
error here. There, the defendant's written plea agreement informed him 
he "was subject to a minimum term of five years, and a maximum term 
of twenty years imprisonment, a minimum term of four years supervised 
release, and a fine of up to $2,000,000." Whyte, 3 F.3d at 129. The 
district court confirmed those ranges during the Rule 11 colloquy. 
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example might well be able to convince a reviewing court 
that the misinformation severely hampered his ability to 
tender an intelligent and knowing guilty plea because he 
was precluded from assessing the risks and benefits of 
pleading guilty. In the words of the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit, the defendant's knowledge of the correct 
information "would have been likely to affect his willingness 
to plead guilty." Johnson, 1 F.3d at 302. 
 
The court in Raineri, therefore appropriately focused 
upon whether "the misinformation . . . at the Rule 11 
hearing lead [the defendant] to expect a lesser penalty than 
he actually received." Id. at 42. In doing so, the court 
rejected the position of those courts that have concluded 
that "a defendant should not be heard to complain if he 
ultimately gets the benefit of the lesser sentence that was 
inaccurately described . . . [when he pled guilty]" so long as 
the sentence is less than the sentence indicated by the 
judge. Id. at 42 (citing cases).10  
 
Although the inquiry into what the defendant might fairly 
expect can sometimes be answered by focusing upon the 
defendant's awareness of his or her maximum exposure, 
the example in Raineri demonstrates that such an approach 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
However, "[i]n truth, Whyte was subject to a mandatory minimum term 
of ten years, not five, a possible maximum term of life, not twenty years, 
a supervised release term of five years, not four, and a fine of 
$4,000,000, not $2,00,000." Id., at 130. Nevertheless, the district court 
subsequently held that its failure to inform Whyte of the correct 
exposure was harmless error. The court of appeals reversed. 
 
10. We recognize that some of the language of the opinion in Raineri, like 
the language in Andrades, suggests that the court is applying a bright 
line rule. For example, the court states: "[c]ourts have commonly held 
that such errors are harmless when the defendant receives a combined 
sentence of imprisonment and supervised release that is less than the 
maximum term of imprisonment earlier described. The same rule is 
followed where the defendant is required to pay restitution in an amount 
less than the potential fine of which he is warned." 42 F.3d at 42. 
However, we do not interpret the court as adopting such a rule -- 
especially in view of the persuasive and helpful hypothetical we have 
quoted above. Rather, we believe the court was simply noting that a 
bright line rule has been used to resolve issues arising under Rule 11. 
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will not always resolve the analysis in a manner consistent 
with the gravity of the court's inquiry or the fundamental 
rights that are involved. We must not forget that the proper 
inquiry here is the validity of the defendant's waiver of 
constitutional guarantees. 
 
This is a subjective, highly individualized test. We must 
focus on the defendant's ability to tender a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of constitutional rights given the 
misinformation he or she received. Johnson, supra. For 
example, in United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400 (4th Cir. 
1995), the trial court's failure to properly inform a 
defendant about a mandatory sentence was ruled not to be 
harmless under Rule 11(h). In reviewing the error, the court 
of appeals focused upon "whether the defendant's 
knowledge and comprehension of the full and correct 
information would have been likely to affect his willingness 
to plead guilty." Id. at 402 (citing United States v. Johnson, 
1 F.3d at 302.)11 
 
We conclude that an error will be regarded as harmless 
under Rule 11(h) only if the government can establish that 
the error is unlikely to have affected a defendant's 
willingness to waive his or her rights and enter a plea of 
guilty. See United States v. Reynoso, 254 F.3d 467, 475 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (distinguishing the burden of proof under 
harmless error review from the burden of proof under plain 
error review). 
 
In conducting that inquiry we must obviously consider 
the nature of the error, and determine if, given the entire 
record (including the defendant's individualized 
circumstances, criminal record, role in the offense, and 
concession for pleading guilty), it affirmatively appears 
unlikely that the error materially hampered his or her 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. In making this determination, the court alluded to three factors: 1) 
"what the defendant actually knows when he pleads guilty on the basis 
of an affirmative indication in the record;" 2) the additional information 
the defendant would have been advised of in compliance with Rule 11; 
and 3) "how the additional or corrected information would have likely 
affected the defendant's decision." Id. (citing United States v. Padilla, 
23 
F.3d 1220, 1222 (7th Cir. 1994) and United States v. Johnson, 1 F.3d 
296, 302 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
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ability to assess the risks and benefits of pleading guilty. At 
first blush, it may appear that such an inquiry is very 
straightforward whenever, as here, a defendant is 
misinformed about the amount of supervised release he or 
she is exposed to, but is correctly informed that the 
maximum incarceration is life imprisonment, and the 
ultimate sentence (including supervised release) is 
substantially less than life. However, focusing only upon 
the severity of the maximum sentence will sometimes 
oversimplify the inquiry. See Raineri, supra. 
 
A defendant with a history of addiction may plead guilty 
in return for a sentence that lengthens imprisonment while 
reducing supervised release, and not plead guilty to a 
sentence with a longer "tail" of supervised release and a 
somewhat shorter period of incarceration. Such a defendant 
may feel that his or her addiction will so impact the 
potential for successful special parole that extended 
incarceration provides a better chance of rehabilitation 
and/or less confinement in the "long run." If such a 
defendant is misinformed about the amount of supervised 
release that can be imposed he or she may not be able to 
accurately gauge the risks of pleading guilty. The resulting 
error may not be harmless therefore, even if the sentence 
that is ultimately imposed is less than the maximum 
imprisonment authorized by law and explained to 
defendant. 
 
Here, Powell was on probation at the time of the instant 
offense. As discussed above, he may have concluded, 
despite his horrendous prior record, that he would not 
receive the maximum sentence. However, given his criminal 
history, a statutory maximum of life imprisonment, and 
Powell's knowledge that the court had to impose at least the 
15 year mandatory minimum, we can not agree that the 
error in informing him of supervised release hampered his 
ability to gauge the risks and benefits of pleading guilty. 
Nothing on this record supports that claim. We recognize 
that Powell expected that he would not receive more than 
three years of supervised release. The supervised release 
term, however, is only one of the many factors that Powell 
had to weigh when deciding whether or not to plead guilty. 
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Before pleading guilty Powell understood that the 
government would make whatever sentencing 
recommendation it deemed appropriate. Powell agreed that 
the court could impose a sentence of life imprisonment, and 
that the court had to impose at least the 15-year 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and a three 
year term of supervised release. Powell was aware that the 
court was not bound by any of the terms of the plea 
agreement, and that he could not withdraw his plea if the 
court declined to follow any recommendation, motion or 
stipulation contained in the agreement. Powell and the 
government also stipulated that Powell's offense level was a 
33 and that he was eligible for a three-level downward 
departure for acceptance of responsibility. The sentence 
reduction triggered by that departure would have been lost 
if Powell had chosen to go to trial. 
 
Despite Powell's current focus on the extra two years of 
supervised release that he was not expecting, we are 
satisfied that he would not have done anything differently 
had he known that he was exposing himself to five years of 
supervised release as opposed to three years at the 
conclusion of his prison sentence. Accordingly, we hold that 
the error here was harmless under Rule 11(h). That does 
not, however, mean that Powell is entitled to no relief. 
 
2. Whether the Government Breached the 
Guilty Plea Agreement 
 
Powell contends that he is entitled to specific 
performance because the government breached the guilty 
plea agreement that told him that he was only exposed to 
a maximum term of three years of supervised release. As 
noted above, it is undisputed that the government did 
inform him that the plea would only expose him to three 
years supervised release, and the court confirmed that at 
the change of plea hearing. 
 
However, to the government's credit, following oral 
argument, the United States Attorney's Office sent a letter 
stating that it would recommend a three-year term of 
supervised release on remand if the district court asks for 
a recommendation from the government. The government 
explained: 
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       The reason is that . . . if the defendant is given the 
       benefit of the doubt the plea agreement may 
       conceivably be read as a promise by the government to 
       recommend a term of supervised release of no more 
       than three years. If that is accurate, and in order to be 
       conservative, we assume it is, that means the 
       government is bound by its agreement not to make any 
       representation to the district court inconsistent with 
       the plea agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Nolan- 
       Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 236 (3d Cir. 1998). While the 
       district court has authority under the plea agreement 
       to enter any legal sentence, the government may not 
       contradict any promise it made regarding the position 
       the government will take. 
 
Letter dated March 9, 2001 from Asst. U.S. Atty. Robert A. 
Zauzmer, Esq. and Asst. U.S. Atty. Kathleen Rice, counsel 
for the government. We commend AUSAs Zauzmer and Rice 
for their candor and the fairness of the position they have 
taken here. Inasmuch as we must remand this matter 
under United States v. Mummert in any event to resolve the 
motion for a downward departure, and inasmuch as the 
government is willing to make this recommendation upon 
remand, we conclude that the issue of Powell's supervised 
release is best resolved by affording the government an 
opportunity to allow the district court to request a 
recommendation, and then sentence in the manner the 
court deems most appropriate under these circumstances. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the sentence 
and remand to the district court for clarification of its 
reasons for denying Powell's pro se motion for downward 
departure. The district court will then have an opportunity 
to elicit the government's position regarding resentencing in 
view of Powell's claim for specific performance. 
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